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En este trabajo estudiamos desde un punto de vista empírico si los países que realizan default 
en su deuda externa soberana ven reducidos los flujos de capitales que reciben tal como ha 
sugerido la literatura. Los datos que utilizamos contienen información de (i) la identidad del 
país que realiza default y sus acreedores y (ii) los flujos de inversión extranjera directa (IED). 
Con esto podemos analizar cómo los flujos de IED son afectados por el default soberano pues 
podemos distinguir los flujos que provienen de los países acreedores y no acreedores. De 
acuerdo a nuestras estimaciones esta distinción es muy relevante pues la disminución de los 
flujos de IED se concentra marcadamente en aquellos provenientes de los países acreedores del 
país que ha cometido default. La caída de la IED es mayor en los años más próximos a la fecha 
de  default y más pronunciada en aquellos países que han cometido default en más 
oportunidades. No encontramos evidencia respecto a que los países que declaran default vean 
reducidas sus opciones de invertir ellos mismos en el exterior, otro de los mecanismos de 





We study empirically if countries that default on their debt experience a reduction in their 
capital inflows as suggested by the literature. Our data contains information on (i) the defaulter 
countries and their creditors and (ii) bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. With this 
we can study how FDI flows are affected by sovereign default distinguishing among those 
coming from defaulters' creditor countries and others. According to our estimations, this 
distinction is crucial since the decline of FDI inflows after default is markedly concentrated on 
those flows originating in defaulters' creditor countries. The decay in FDI flows is higher in the 
years closer to the default date and for countries that have defaulted more times. We do not find 
evidence that countries shut their doors to defaulters' investment abroad, which is also a cost of 
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Banco Central de Chile 1 Introduction and Motivation
From time to time some countries restructure or default on their sovereign foreign debt. The fact
that in sovereign markets there are no analogues to bankruptcy laws and procedures as those that
exist in domestic debt markets raises a number of interesting issues. One of them is the well known
question of why countries ever repay their debts given that their creditors don't have expedite tools
to recoup the defaulted amount and impose a penalty on the defaulter. Since cross-border lending
to sovereign entities is actually observed, it seems obvious that default is deterred through some
mechanism. Our goal in this paper is to provide empirical evidence on one of the potential costs
that defaulter countries might su®er: a decrease of capital in°ows. This channel might serve as a
punishment to deter future defaults and help then explain why cross-border sovereign debt markets
actually exists.
Several works in the theoretical literature have identi¯ed the reduction in capital °ows, per-
manent or temporary, as a possible punishment from default (see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a
survey of the literature). In some of these papers default is a possible equilibrium outcome whether
in others the threat of exclusion from capital markets prevents observing voluntary defaults and
punishment in equilibrium. The seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and its followers
(e.g. Arellano (2008)) could be included in the ¯rst group. In these models markets are incom-
plete and countries may prefer to default and be excluded from access to capital markets under
some circumstances (e.g. bad shocks). The second group of works uses the exclusion from capital
markets to derive, in a complete market setting, constrained e±cient contracts where the threat of
exclusion from capital markets prevent debtor countries from voluntary defaulting on their debts.
Thus, voluntary default and punishment are not actually observed in equilibrium (e.g. Grossman
and Van Huyck (1988) and Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2007)). However, in these settings it is
possible to observe defaults that are associated with justi¯ed contingencies (e.g. bad shocks). These
are \excusable default" using Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) words and would not be punished
since they are contingencies considered in the contract. Consequently, these models predict that
punishment would not be actually observed.
In the real world defaults are actually observed and it remains an open empirical question to
see if they are followed by a punishment through less capital °ows to the defaulter country. The
goal of this paper is not to elucidate if these defaults are excusable or voluntary but simply to see
if there is exclusion from capital markets as a consequence of default. However, if there were a
correctly identi¯ed reduction in capital °ows as a consequence of a default, it could be interpreted
2as evidence in favor of non-excusable default.1
We study if exclusion from capital markets is a relevant channel considering di®erent char-
acteristics of the debtor-creditor relationship, of the default and of defaulting countries that may
a®ect their access to international capital markets. To conduct the analysis, we use data on FDI
°ows and defaults which are both of bilateral nature. The data on FDI allows us to identify which
country is the source and which country is the host or recipient of FDI °ows. Also, as Rose (2005),
Martinez and Sandleris (2006) and Arteta and Hale (2008), to date default episodes we use data
on debt restructured at the Paris Club. This source gives information on the countries that re-
structured their debts and the speci¯c creditors that were involved in the renegotiation process.
Combining these two data sources we are able to distinguish if the reduction (if any) of capital
in°ows to defaulter countries comes from those countries directly a®ected by the default or from
every country that could be a supplier of foreign capital.
In addition to allowing us to study issues that have not been analyzed in previous work, this
structure of the data is useful to deal with some identi¯cation concerns that could be present in
other papers that have studied the existence of a punishment mechanism through capital °ows.
Typically the literature has measured sovereign default with a dummy variable indicating the years
during which the country has ceased to comply with its debt obligations. This method to measure
default has a number of potential identi¯cation problems. One of the main concerns is that the
default dummy is really measuring a generalized economic disruption.
From this perspective, it is not clear whether a negative coe±cient of a default dummy on total
capital in°ows is really capturing a punishment imposed by disgruntled creditors or a worsening
of defaulters' economic outlook that could drive a fall in investment and the default. Thus, there
could be a missing variable problem, e.g. the technological state of the country, that is driving
default, output and investment.2 In contrast to this, our data allows us to distinguish if the decline
in capital (FDI) in°ows is from those countries which debts were defaulted upon or, in addition,
from other countries. A general decline in capital in°ows might be related to a worsening in the
economic situation of the defaulter while a decline from those countries directly involved in the
default would be more related to a punishment to the defaulter.
Defaults may increase political or institutional instability or the risk of future expropriation
and the reduction in capital in°ows could be the consequence of these factors rather than the
1Some of the theoretical works where non-excusable defaults are not observed in equilibrium are motivated by
empirical works that do not ¯nd evidence of punishment after default.
2For example Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2007) present a model where, when a participation constraint binds,
capital is lower after bad shocks than after good ones. This suggests that the reduction in FDI could be assigned to
a default when it is really a consequence of a bad shock.
3consequence of default.3 We think that our approach helps identi¯cation of default punishments in
these cases. We would expect a reduction from all sources if the cause of this reduction were an
increase in debtor's political or institutional stability or its appetite for expropriation. In addition,
if defaults lead to a fear of future expropriation and an equilibrium fall in foreign investment, this
could be a signi¯cant threat that could sustain sovereign lending.
The other advantage of the data assembled in this paper in comparison to previous work in
the literature is that it reduces the problem of reverse causality that might hamper the identi¯cation
of a punishment through capital in°ows to defaulter countries. Since countries to which the debtor
country defaults upon were \selected" when the debt contracts were signed, the composition of this
group of countries is already de¯ned at the moment of default. This feature of the data indicates
that our default measure is unlikely to be a®ected by current FDI °ows. Thus, we believe, that a
valuable contribution of this paper is to use bilateral information on FDI and default to alleviate
the problems of identi¯cation just mentioned.
The experience of Russia provides an interesting case study for the dynamics of FDI observed
after sovereign default and it is illustrative of the motivation of this work. As is well known the
Russian default of 1997 is one of the largest in recent memory. Germany and Japan were two of the
creditors of the Russian government and among the biggest sources of FDI in the ¯rst part of the
1990s. After the default Germany's stock of FDI in Russia declined 10% in spite of the fact that
the total FDI stock of German ownership in the world increase by 20%. On the other hand, the
value of Japan's investment in Russia stood in 1999 at 18 millions of dollars, in sharp contrast to
the stock of 940 millions of dollars at the end of 1997. This contrasts with the case of Korea that
was not a creditor of Russia and whose FDI investment in Russia increased in the year following
the default. The purpose of this paper is to uncover if this pattern that suggests a punishment to
the defaulter is observed in a broader sample.
The evidence we present in this paper suggests indeed that countries directly involved in the
default reduce their capital °ows to the defaulter country. On the contrary, there is no evidence that
capital °ows from those countries to which the debtor does not default diminish in the aftermath
of sovereign default. This seems to indicate the existence of a punishment to defaulting countries
imposed by their creditors.
We also analyze if the amount of debt defaulted is important for the punishment. The premise
is that higher defaults would harm more the international ¯nancial community and therefore would
be more heavily punished. Along with this one can expect that creditors would like to make the
3See Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2007) and Thomas and Worrall (1994) for models where the risk of expro-
priation a®ects investment in a country.
4penalty to defaulters contingent on the amount defaulted to provide incentives that lead to minimize
the amount defaulted if countries choose to renege on its external obligations. We ¯nd some evidence
that higher amounts defaulted lead to lower levels of capital in°ows. However, this result should be
taken with caution since we only have data on the amount renegotiated at the Paris Club but not
data on the actual haircut or losses that creditors su®er.
Next we analyze if capital out°ows from defaulting countries are reduced after an event of
default since a possible punishment is that countries close their doors to defaulters' investment
abroad. This empirical exercise is inspired by the work of Bulow and Rogo® (1989) and Wright
(2002). Bulow and Rogo® (1989) showed that exclusion from capital markets as default punishment
would not be relevant if defaulters have access to an investment technology abroad and Wright (2002)
showed that this punishment is still relevant if international creditors collude to punish the defaulter
preventing it from investing abroad. Our empirical ¯ndings do not support this conjecture since we
do not ¯nd evidence that defaulter countries' investment abroad is reduced after a default.4
If there are costs derived from default it is likely that they last only for a limited number
of periods as suggested by anecdotal and empirical evidence discussed below. In this respect we
¯nd that the longer the time elapsed since a default, the larger the capital in°ows to the defaulter
country. We also study if the history of a country as a defaulter a®ect the capital °ows of the country
after the default. Here the premise is that countries with a higher number of defaults would have
a worse reputation than countries with a lower number of defaults. The results we obtain con¯rm
this: countries with a large track record on defaults receive lower capital °ows.
Since Paris Club debt includes only o±cial debt we are considering only sovereign defaults
in our analysis.5 On the other hand, there are many kinds of cross-border capital °ows and we
focus our study in one of them, FDI °ows, which have become the main source of capital °ows
to developing countries. FDI °ows are mainly transactions among private parties so it might not
be immediately apparent why a sovereign default might a®ect them. Nevertheless, the use of FDI
°ows can be justi¯ed on several grounds. There is a literature on the bene¯ts of FDI to a country
that would make a relevant punishment its reduction as a consequence of default and it is an open
empirical question if sovereign default has an e®ect on FDI (and capital °ows in general). Also,
although the theoretical literature on the exclusion of capital markets does not distinguish in general
between types of capital °ows, from many works it can be inferred from their modeling that the
capital °ow has FDI characteristics. Lastly, and very importantly from the prospective of this work,
4In Wright (2002) repudiation is not observed in equilibrium and thus the model predicts that the punishment of
the collusion of foreign creditors would not be observed in equilibrium. However, we think that is a relevant empirical
exercise to see if this punishment is actually observed.
5As noted below there are many de¯nitions of defaults and one of them has to be chosen in order to conduct the
analysis.
5the use of FDI data is useful because it is one of the few cross-border capital °ows for which there
exists bilateral data that identi¯es both countries included in each deal for an extended period
of time. As explained earlier this feature of the data is crucial to our identi¯cation strategy of a
punishment for sovereign default.
There are several mechanisms through which default among sovereign governments might
a®ect FDI which is an economic transaction mostly between private sector entities. First, sovereign
governments might exert pressure to domestic ¯rms to stop doing business with defaulter countries.
An example of this is provided by Chile's chief negotiator during the debt crisis of the 1980s.
He mentions that the main Chilean mining public company (which provides a signi¯cant share of
government revenues) had problems doing business with Japanese counterparts while the Chilean
debt was in default due to the pressure exerted by Japanese government on those ¯rms.6 This
example reveals that governments can impose costs on defaulter countries. Apart from this informal
mechanism, there are two additional channels that might explain the decline in FDI after sovereign
default documented in our paper.
First, governments sometimes provide insurance contracts to FDI activities undertaken by
¯rms of their countries abroad. A default on sovereign debt triggers a retaliation of the sovereign
government through denial of this insurance which in turns hinders FDI in the defaulter. This
mechanism has been highlighted in the aftermath of the Argentinean default of 2001. The collapse
of FDI in°ows has been attributed in several press reports to the lack of FDI insurance that has
ceased to be provided by disgruntled source-country governments.7 The second mechanism through
which sovereign default could be followed by a decline of FDI concerns the role of export-promotion
agencies of developed countries. These agencies provide subsidized credit for ¯rms willing to es-
tablish foreign subsidiaries and export back to their home countries. Governments that have been
defaulted upon tend to freeze this type of ¯nancing which naturally leads to a decline of FDI in the
defaulter country.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the related
empirical literature, Section 3 describes the data on FDI °ows and on defaults that we use in
the paper, Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology and some econometric issues that arise.
Section 5 presents the results while section 6 concludes the paper.
6See Somerville (1990)
7This information appeared in La Nacion, an Argentinean newspaper on August 17 and 22 of 2007.
8This mechanism is highlighted by Abram, de la Balze, Gonz¶ alez, Krause, and Rodr¶ ³guez (2007) in the aftermath
of Argentina's default of 2001.
62 Literature Review
Now lets turn our attention to the literature that has studied, from an empirical point of view, the
reasons why sovereign countries repay their foreign debts and the related question of the sanctions
that fall upon defaulting countries. We will review the evidence on each of the punishment channels
that have been mentioned in the theoretical literature. First we will consider the extent to which
defaulter countries experience a greater di±culties to borrow from international capital markets.
These di±culties can take two forms: exclusion from new funds and/or an increase in the cost of
the funds borrowed.
An important body of evidence on this issue originates in the work that followed the Debt
Crises of the 1980s, when developing countries -especially in Latin America- defaulted on their
foreign debt obligations. Regarding the eventual costs of defaulting both Eichengreen (1989) and
Lindert and Morton (1989) found no evidence that defaulters were punished by creditors through
higher interest rates on new loans. Moreover, those authors show that defaulters and non-defaulters
were both excluded from international capital markets. This ¯nding might be in part due to the
fact, acknowledged by the authors, that they use post-Debt Crisis data where capital °ows to all
developing countries came to a complete stop. In a related paper Ozler (1993) ¯nds that past
defaulters did have to pay a premium on the interest rate for sovereign debt issued in the 1970s.
She ¯nds that defaults previous to 1930 do not a®ect the premium paid but defaults after that year
do a®ect it. However, the premium is quantitatively small and does not constitute a punishment
that appears likely to deter future defaults.
After a long hiatus the empirical literature on the costs of default revived again in recent
years after the sovereign defaults of Russia in 1997 and Argentina in 2001.9 Eichengreen and Portes
(2000) revisit the historical evidence on the costs of default focusing on access to international
capital markets and the premium on the interest rate paid by each country. Regarding the ¯rst
of these, they ¯nd no clear evidence that previous default hinders access to international capital
markets when analyzing post World War II data. Along with this, there is no robust evidence
that countries that have defaulted on their sovereign obligations end up paying a higher premium
on subsequent debt issues.10 This result is also corroborated by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) who
¯nd a \surprisingly small" e®ect of past default on the interest rate spread of sovereign debt.
Eichengreen and Portes (2000) also look at the more recent evidence of debt issues of the 1990s and
9One of the central themes of this more recent work is to design optimal institutions to deal with sovereign default,
especially the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in the aftermath of default. This topic is beyond the scope of
this paper, see Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Eichengreen and Portes (2000) for a thorough discussion of this
issue.
10This evidence is reported in Tables 3 and 4 of Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
7also ¯nd no evidence that previous debt rescheduling limits access to international capital markets.
Nevertheless, countries that have failed to meet the original terms of their foreign obligations face
a interest rate spread which, although signi¯cant, does not appear to forbid these countries access
to new international credit.
Apart from these traditional punishment mechanisms of access to international capital markets
some recent papers have explored other channels that the theoretical literature has identi¯ed as
potential deterrents for sovereign default. One of these is the work of Mitchener and Weidenmeir
(2005) that ¯nds, using early 20th century data, that super-sanctions appear to be an e®ective
mechanism to deter new defaulters. These super-sanctions include military aggressions by creditor
countries and the forceful seizure of foreign currency-generating assets (e.g. the national customs
administration) of defaulting countries. Even though Mitchener and Weidenmeir (2005) is one of
the ¯rst papers to identify empirically an e®ective punishment for defaulters, these sanctions might
be di±cult to implement nowadays. 11
Finally, Rose (2005) studies another possible punishment mechanism: the reduction in bi-
lateral trade that might follow after a sovereign default. As reviewed earlier, this is one of the
channels that the theoretical literature has identi¯ed as a potential cost of default. One of the most
interesting features of Rose (2005) is that his data identi¯es both the defaulter and the creditor
countries involved in each default episode. Combining this information with bilateral trade data
he ¯nds that trade between a defaulting country and its creditors declines following a default. His
estimations indicates that the reduction in bilateral trade is equal to 8% per year and lasts for up
to 15 years. In a related paper, Martinez and Sandleris (2006) argue that, even though countries'
international trade declines after declaring sovereign default, the decay is not concentrated in the
bilateral trade with creditor countries.
Similarly to Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2006), we will use bilateral data to test
for the existence of punishment to defaulters. Nevertheless, we will focus on bilateral capital °ows
instead of goods and services' trade and study a more ample set of punishment mechanisms. As will
be explained later, the use of bilateral capital °ows data allows to identify with greater accuracy
the existence of an access-to-international-capital-markets punishment mechanism. In particular,
we are able to distinguish between a \general" and \creditor speci¯c" punishment, similar to what
Martinez and Sandleris (2006) analyze for trade °ows. Since we are able to distinguish among
North-to-South and South-to-North capital °ows, another contribution of the paper is that we can
test if defaulters are also limited in their investment options abroad. As explained earlier this is also
a punishment mechanism suggested by the literature and we will test its empirical relevance here.
11Wright (2002) illustrates the di±culties of imposing direct sanctions to sovereign defaulters with an eloquent
narrative of the failed attempts of one of Russia's creditors to seize that country's assets.
8From this perspective, our paper will complement previous e®orts that have analyzed if capital
in°ows to defaulting countries decline in the aftermath of default. The details of the database that
will allow us to implement this test are given in the next section.
3 Bilateral Capital Flows and Defaults Database
In order to test if defaulter countries are punished by their disgruntled creditors we need two pieces
of information: (1) the identity of the creditor countries to which the country defaulted and (2)
information on some economic interaction between the creditor and defaulter countries that allow
to judge if the latter punish defaulting countries. The information on defaulter and creditor country
pairs comes from the Paris Club renegotiations and debt restructuring database. With regard to
the economic interaction among the creditor and the defaulter, in this paper we use FDI °ows
among them to gauge the existence of punishment for defaulting countries. As explained in Section
1 the eventual reduction of bilateral FDI °ows could be a relevant punishment mechanism and its
analysis is the main contribution of the paper. We will obtain the data on bilateral FDI °ows from
the OECD (see OECD (2004)). Let's now provide a brief description of each of these data sources.
3.1 The Paris Club
The Paris Club is an organization of o±cial creditors that meet several times a year to agree
on restructuring deals of sovereign obligations of countries undergoing repayment di±culties. The
debts subject to rescheduling are those subscribed by sovereign governments or that have an explicit
guarantee of the public sector. Countries undergoing payment di±culties can apply to the Paris
Club in order to obtain debt relief by the creditor countries. The negotiations take place under the
following four principles:12
1. Imminent Default: there must be an agreement that the debtor country is not going to be able
to meet its foreign obligations under the current conditions. For this agreement to be reached,
the IMF issues a report indicating that the country is headed towards sovereign default. In
practice when countries apply for a Paris Club rescheduling they usually have already failed
to meet some of their sovereign debt payments.13
2. IMF Plan: the debtor country must have agreed to an Appropriate Conditionality IMF plan.
12This information appears in Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Rose (2005)
13This seems to have been the regular practice during the debt crisis of the 1980s according to Somerville (1990).
9This requirement aims to assure that the debtor country is committed to a set of economic
policies consistent with macroeconomic order and an increased probability of debt repayment.
3. Equitable Burden Sharing: all creditors must participate in the debt relief operation. An
important exception to this principle are the debts owed to the IMF who in turn is expected
to provide fresh ¯nancing for the debtor in distress. Moreover, the debtor agrees to refuse
debt relief from other creditors (i.e. outside the Paris Club) that o®er them worse conditions
than those agreed with the Paris Club.
4. Consensus: all members of the Club must agree to the debt relief plan granted to the debtor.
Even though this clause could potentially delay agreements it has not been the case in practice
as negotiations are fully ¯nished in most cases in less than a year.14
The Paris Club's website provides information on all the restructuring deals that have been
reached including:
² The countries participating in each restructuring deal identifying in particular all the creditor
countries involved in each deal.
² The amounts of sovereign debt restructured.
² Other details of the renegotiation such as type of deal and time allowed for repayment.
For the purpose of this paper, the most useful information is that contained in the ¯rst two
elements just listed. We collected the information on all the Paris Club deals since this organization
started functioning in 1956 until 2003. In Table 1 we present the complete list of all the countries
that have renegotiated their debt at the Paris Club since 1980.15
It should be noted that the Paris Club data is, up to our knowledge, the only source that iden-
ti¯es the countries to which each defaulter fails to meet the contractual obligations. The information
of the individual creditors to which a country defaulted is a key element of our identi¯cation strat-
egy of a capital-°ows punishment mechanism since it allows us to distinguish among two di®erent
phenomena:
14See Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Rose (2005)
15The reader will notice that the default of Argentina in 2001 is not included in the list. Our data on FDI °ows
spans only through 2003 and Argentina started negotiating with the Paris Club after that year but at the time of
this writing no agreement between the two parties had been reached. The omission of Argentina's most recent default
episodes does not appear to a®ect our results: as a consistency check we ran all the regressions presented in Section
5 up to the year 2000 and the results don't change.
10² A generalized sanction which corresponds to a decrease in capital in°ows from all countries
that can potentially invest in the defaulting country.
² A creditor-speci¯c mechanism that is related to the decline of FDI in°ows originating in the
creditor countries to which the recipient country defaulted.
The ability to sort between these two e®ects is one of the main contributions of this paper.
As we explain in Section 4 below, previous work on the e®ect of default on capital °ows assumes
that defaulter countries are punished uniformly by all countries and this might explain why there
is no conclusive evidence that foreign capital in°ows are reduced in the aftermath of a sovereign
default.
The possibility to identify both the defaulter and the creditors of each default is the key
characteristic of the Paris Club data. The other indicators of default that are available, notably
Standard and Poor's, only indicate the identity of the defaulter. Nevertheless both sources for
default information tend to coincide. In Appendix A we provide a detailed comparison of both data
sources.
It is important to note that Paris Club agreements are best characterized as a restructuring
of sovereign obligations that involves a \haircut" of varying intensity in the amount the defaulting
country will repay to its creditors. In this sense, Paris Club deals do not represent a complete cease
of payments of sovereign debt. Hence, the expression \sovereign default" should be interpreted
really as a \sovereign restructuring" and we will use the terms interchangeably. This feature is
by no means a limitation of our data since the complete renege by a country of its foreign debts
is an extremely rare event: most \defaults" are really restructuring of previously agreed payment
schedules. 16
The Paris Club restructuring deals can be classi¯ed in four di®erent categories: \Classic",
\Houston", \Naples" and \Cologne". The last three types of agreements are reserved for Highly-
Indebted countries and contemplate explicit reductions of the debtor's obligations. Nevertheless,
these agreements exist only since 1994 and have been used mainly by poor countries that have also
quali¯ed for other debt relief programs (e.g. the HIPC initiative). Indeed, the majority of the debt
rescheduling agreements in our database correspond to the so called \Classic" rescheduling deals. In
these negotiations, the creditors concessions consist in an extension of the period over which debts
must be repayed and an interest rate that assures reduction of the present value of the obligations.
16See Rose (2005) for a discussion of this issue. The interchangeable use of the terms \default" and \restructuring"
is also common in many other papers that study sovereign default as exempli¯ed by Reinhart, Rogo®, and Savastano
(2003).
11Nevertheless this does not imply that creditors do not grant some amount of debt relief: Roubini
and Setser (2004) indicate that when the new schedule of payments is discounted at the market
discount rates, the result is a signi¯cant reduction in the net present value of the creditors' claims.
In synthesis then, the \Classic" agreements of the Paris Club most likely include a \haircut" to the
value of the defaulting country's debt but we don't have detailed information on the exact amount
of it.17
3.2 Foreign Direct Investment Data
As we have explained, we will analyze the cost of sovereign default looking at the behavior of FDI
activity. This type of capital °ow is almost always a transaction among private entities. Our default
measure on the other hand corresponds to default by sovereign nations which are public entities.
Even though these facts might be a concern, in the real world there are channels through which
sovereign defaults a®ect investments in those countries, for example, the ability of insurance and
funds to ¯nance such investments is reduced (see our discussion of the mechanisms in Section 1).
In the end, the e®ects of sovereign defaults on private capital °ows, like FDI, remains a question to
be answered through empirical analysis and one of the main goals of this paper is to provide more
systematic evidence on the empirical relevance of these issues.18
The data on FDI bilateral °ows comes from the OECD's \International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook" (see OECD (2004)) which contains information for the years 1980 to 2003.
This publication contains information on both FDI bilateral °ows and stocks between reporting
OECD countries and between those same countries and a selected group of non-OECD countries.19
The whole set of countries is listed in Table 2. As can be seen we have further divided OECD in two
groups: Industrial OECD and Developing OECD where the latter group comprises countries who
have become members of the OECD in the last ten years or whose income levels are signi¯cantly
below those of the Industrial OECD. The reason for this classi¯cation is that the data coverage
between these two groups is very di®erent so this classi¯cation allows us to increase the total
number of country-pairs observations available. 20
17The losses su®ered by creditors varies signi¯cantly in di®erent renegotiation processes. Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2005) and Jorgensen and Sachs (1989) looking at various rescheduling episodes across a wide histor-
ical period report that the size of the debt relief granted to defaulters varies between 15% and 70%.
18Other work that has tried to look at cost of sovereign default have also analyzed the e®ect on outcomes on the
private sector. See for example Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Eichengreen and Mody (1999) and Arteta and Hale
(2008).
19This data set has been widely used in the study of FDI. See for instance Levy-Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2004)
and Daude and Stein (2006)
20See Data Appendix for details on the data coverage of the FDI database.
12The basic features of the Paris Club rescheduling agreements and the FDI °ows are presented
in Tables 3 and 4. There are 21,475 valid bilateral FDI °ows observations the majority of which
is concentrated among the Industrial OECD countries as column 4 of Table 3 shows. This is in
part due to the fact that reporting countries are precisely those in the OECD but also re°ects
a well known feature of international capital markets: the bulk of cross-border capital °ows takes
place between rich countries. Nevertheless, rich-country to poor-country capital °ows are signi¯cant
amounting to 13% of all the capital °ows in the sample and in per capita terms represent a number
in the order of magnitude of those observed within rich-countries. One potential drawback of this
data is that it contains very little information on FDI °ows originating in Non-OECD countries.
This small-sample problem might be a concern in order to test another of the potential punishment
mechanisms identi¯ed by the theoretical literature: the prohibition for defaulting countries to buy
foreign assets.
The characteristics of our bilateral default data are summarized in Table 4. It should be noted
that this statistics were computed for the period 1980-2003, the same for which FDI bilateral °ows
are available. As can be seen in the Table, there are 749 bilateral default observations during this
period which are related to 52 renegotiation processes. 21 As expected all the defaulter countries
are located outside the Industrial OECD where the vast majority of creditor countries belong to.
Table 4 also reveals that Paris Club deals involve signi¯cant amounts of country's debts so they
represent genuine episodes of con°ict between creditors and debtors.
Finally the gross (i.e. not distinguishing by type of country pair) descriptive statistics of the
FDI and the default variables are presented in Table 5. As can be seen there are negative °ows
in the data. Since the data we have measures gross °ows, the occurrence of negative FDI °ows
is not surprising since rational investors can decide to decrease the stock of investment in certain
countries. Moreover, this feature of the data suggests that the eventual punishment might occur
not only through a reduction in in°ows but also through an increase in out°ows.
21The ¯rst Paris Club agreement was in 1956 and there were several renegotiating deals in the 1970s. It should be
noted though that the Reputation and Punishment dummies are calculated from 1956 on. See Section 4 for details.
134 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Econometric Speci¯cation
The methodology we will use in this paper to study the punishment mechanism to defaulting
countries using bilateral FDI °ows is based on the econometric speci¯cations used more frequently
in the literature. The empirical determinants of FDI have been studied in several papers and we will
draw on them for our estimation equation.22 Since at this time there is no consensus in the literature
regarding which is the \correct" econometric model, the regression we use captures elements from
the ones most commonly used in previous work on the ¯eld. The speci¯c model we use is the
following panel regression:
Yijt = ¯ Parisijt + ° Unilateraljt + ± Amountjt + µ Excludeijt + ­Zijt +
¦Xijt + ®ij + ²ijt
(1)
Where:
1. Yijt corresponds to the FDI °ows from country i to country j in year t normalized by country's
j GDP in year t.23
2. Parisijt is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if country j restructured its sovereign
obligations to country i in year t through a Paris Club deal and 0 otherwise.
3. Unilateraljt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if country j start a restructuring of its
foreign sovereign debts in year t through the Paris Club and 0 otherwise.
4. Amountjt corresponds to the total value of the debts that the defaulter country (j) asks its
creditors to be rescheduled in the Paris Club deal taking place in t. This variable is also
normalized by country's j GDP in period t. We should make two important caveats here.
First, the Paris Club database does not contain information on the amount the defaulter
country wants to reschedule with each one of its creditors, only the aggregated amount.
22See for example Blonigen (2005), Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003), Daude and Stein (2006), Razin, Sadka, and
Tong (2005), Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004) and Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and Stein (2002).
23There is a slight di®erence in the de¯nition of the Y variable between the Capital Flows and the International
Trade literatures. The latter includes in Y the total volume of trade between country i and j in year t while the
Capital Flows only uses the the unidirectional °ow from i to j. Our de¯nition of the Y variable follows then the
common de¯nition of the Capital Flows literature in order to make our results comparable to previous work.
14Hence, the data on the amount defaulted will only allow us to test for an aggregate e®ect
and not a bilateral-speci¯c punishment. Furthermore, the Amount variable measures only the
amount brought by the defaulter country to the negotiating table, it does indicate the capital
loss agreed upon by the creditors after the deal is ¯nalized. In this sense, Amount does not
measure the true amount of default and is only a proxy of the true losses (if any) that the
defaulting country imposes on its creditors. In spite of this we will use Amountjt to gauge if
the size of default in°uences the extent of the reputation loss for the country.
5. Excludeijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i defaulted on its external obli-
gations to country j in year t. A negative coe±cient µ will provide support to the hypothesis
that defaulters are punished through a reduced menu of investment options.
6. Z is a matrix of controls that measure di®erent features of the previous history of defaults.
With these variables we will try to study dynamic aspects of the the punishment that creditors
might impose on defaulters. These variables are:
² Periods elapsed since last default. With this variable we intend to measure how quickly
creditors \forgive" default.
² Number of defaults in last k years. This variable will capture if creditors forget defaults
that have taken place in the past and the extent to which they remember (and punish)
more when defaults have been more frequent. We use two values for k, 5 and 10.
² A default in the last k years. We also use 5 and 10 as possible values of k. These are
dummy variables that are equal, respectively, to one when country j defaulted to country
i in any of the k years before t.
It is important to clarify that all the variables in Z are computed since 1956 and 2003 that
corresponds to the whole period of operation of the Paris Club. Since the FDI data begins
in 1980 this implies that the inclusion of the reputational variables included in Z in equation
(1) does not change the sample on which we tested our other speci¯cations. Hence, we can
assess that any eventual changes in our results among the di®erent regressions will not be the
result of changes in the sample.
The structure of Equation (1) allows us to distinguish between two di®erent e®ects of defaults
on FDI in°ows to defaulting countries as discussed in Section 3:
² A generalized decline from the international community measured by coe±cient °.
² A speci¯c decrease of FDI from the creditor countries to which the recipient country defaulted
upon. This e®ect is measured by our estimate of ¯.
15The identi¯cation of these two di®erent e®ects is due to the way in which the variables Paris
and Unilateral are de¯ned. If country j defaults on its sovereign debt in period t, FDI to it from the
typical country in the world would decline in ° units. In addition to this there will an incremental
decline in FDIijt °ows to country j if country i is a creditor of j.
It should also be noted that our variable Unilateral is also a proxy of the fact that the
defaulting country (j) is undergoing a period of macroeconomic distress in period t. Therefore
the coe±cient ° can also be interpreted as the e®ect on FDI in°ows of the economic crisis that
the recipient country is experimenting whereas ¯ captures the additional decline from the creditor
countries.
The ability to distinguish among these channels is an important di®erence with previous
studies that have tried to gauge if defaulter countries lose access to international capital markets.
The econometric speci¯cation used in those papers (reviewed in Section 2) assumes that capital
°ows to the defaulter fall uniformly from all countries no matter if they were directly involved in
the default. The impossibility to use a more °exible speci¯cation might be the reason why previous
studies don't ¯nd strong evidence that countries su®er the cost of smaller capital in°ows after
defaulting on their foreign debts.
In matrix Xijt we include a number of controls variables that should in°uence bilateral FDI
°ows from a theoretical standpoint and are commonly included in empirical models used to analyze
bilateral FDI. 24 The variables included in X and their expected e®ect on the amount of bilateral
FDI observed between countries i and j are the following:
² GDP per capita of country j in year t. As is well known, most FDI is received by developed
countries so controlling for this variable is important. This variable will also capture institu-
tional characteristics which are not picked up by the institutions variables detailed below.
² An indicator variable if country i and j have a trade agreement in year t. This variable is
expected to in°uence the °ow of FDI between a pair of countries but the direction is not clear.
If, on the one hand, FDI is driven by an incentive to \jump tari®s" and other barriers to trade,
then a trade agreement between a pair of countries will lead to a smaller amount of FDI. On
the other hand, if FDI is motivated by a desire to locate the di®erent stages of the production
process in the optimal location, then a trade agreement might increase the amount of FDI.
This because lower trade barriers will make it more convenient for multinational ¯rms to ship
24See for example Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005b) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych
(2005a) who study the determinants of unilateral capital °ows and Levy-Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2004) and Daude
and Stein (2006) that use a model similar to ours for bilateral FDI stocks.
16un¯nished goods across national borders and hence increase the incentives to build factories
in di®erent locations.25
² A measure of the level of ¯nancial development in country j. For this we compute the ratio
of credit to the private sector to GDP using data from the IFS as suggested by Beck, Levine,
and Loayza (1999). The sign on this variable can be either negative or positive. On the
one hand, this variable can have negative coe±cient since if, all else constant, the receiving
country's capital markets are more developed there is relatively less need of foreign capital
because domestic savings can be e±ciently channeled to pro¯table projects. On the other
hand, Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004a) show that FDI has a bigger impact
in the receiving country's economic growth when ¯nancial markets are more developed. Hence,
one can expect that countries with more developed ¯nancial markets will receive more FDI
in°ows. It will be an empirical question then to see which of these e®ects dominates.
² Di®erence in the education attainments of countries i and j taken from the Barro and Lee
data set. This is computed as the di®erence in the average years of secondary schooling in
the total population of country j and that of country i. This variable is expected to re°ect
di®erences in the long-run level of income per capita and hence in the marginal product of
capital in the framework of Solow's growth model as explained in Lucas (1990). According to
this logic, the lower the educational attainment in country j with respect to that of country
i the smaller the amount of capital that country j will invest in country i. This variable
has been found to be an important determinant of cross border FDI °ows in the studies that
are inspired by the CMM model as explained by Blonigen (2005) and Carr, Markusen, and
Maskus (2001).
² The ratio of country's j total trade to GDP as a measure of openness to trade. This is
calculated using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. This variable
been found to be an important determinant of the amount of FDI received by a country
(see Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005b)) since it proxies for the general outward
orientation of the economy and the its level of income. The expected sign of the coe±cient
on this variable is therefore positive.
² In°ation volatility in country j. This variable proxies for the quality of macroeconomic policies
in the receiving country and is expect to exert a negative in°uence in the amount of FDI °ows
received from country i.
² A measure of the degree of openness of the capital account in country j. This series corresponds
to the one constructed in Chinn and Ito (2002) and higher values of it indicate greater degree
of openness to cross-border capital °ows. In light of this we expect a positive coe±cient on
25See Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) for a discussion of these issues.
17this variable.26
² Variables that measure the quality of institutions in country j, the one at the the receiving end
of the FDI °ow. We use a measure an index of Government Stability and one of Corruption
from the \International Country Risk Guide" by the PRS Group and an indicator for the
degree of constraints on the executive branch of government compiled in the Polity database.
As highlighted by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005a) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Volosovych (2005b) the quality of the receiving country's institutions is a key determinant
of its capital in°ows. They operate through the same channels that stimulate investment in
general. Given that increases in all these indexes correspond to better institutions we expect
a positive coe±cient on each of them.
² An indicator variable that takes the value one in the case that the country has a program with
the IMF. This variable is in the spirit of the literature on the Role of the IMF as catalyzer
of capital °ows (see for example Mody and Saravia (2006)). In our case this variable is also
important because, as explained above, renegotiations in the Club of Paris generally \requires"
an IMF program. Consequently, variables referring to IMF programs and variables indicating
Paris Club renegotiations are likely to be correlated. Thus, in order to disentangle the e®ects
of default the inclusion of this variable is guaranteed.
² And indicator variable that takes the value 1 when country j is su®ering a Balance of Payment
crisis in year t. To compute this variable we use the criteria outlined by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999). We include this control to discard the concern that our default variables
Paris and Unilateral are capturing a generalized macroeconomic disruption in country j
and not a punishment from its creditors as we hypothesize.
² GDP gaps for both countries i and j in year t. The purpose of these variables is to control for
the stage of the business cycle in which both countries are since Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and
Stein (2002)'s results suggest that FDI exhibit a signi¯cant cyclical component. Along with
this, the inclusion of GDP gaps in the regression will reduce the likelihood that the variable
Paris is capturing a macroeconomic shock common to countries i and j in year t that could
also a®ect FDI °ows instead of the e®ect of sovereign default.
² The interaction between GDP gaps of both countries i and j in year t. The inclusion of this
variable is to capture the relation that countries' business cycles may have. It is likely that
countries that are involved in debt and investment relationships have some coordination in
their business cycles. This control variable would be useful to reduce the possibility that our
results concerning the e®ect of bilateral default on bilateral FDI °ows are driven by common
shocks between creditor and debtor countries.
26This indicator of capital account openness synthesizes the restrictions to various types of capital °ows. Therefore,
considering that there might be some degree of substitution among di®erent types of capital °ows, an increase in this
index might not necessarily imply a bigger volume of FDI °ows.
18Finally, ®ij is a ¯xed e®ect that will capture all the non-time variant characteristics of the
dyad of countries i and j. The inclusion of this ¯xed e®ect implies that variables like distance
between i and j, common language among the countries and common colonizer will not be included
in the regression equation (1). We prefer to use ¯xed e®ects since this allows to control for all the
unobserved time-invariant country pair characteristics and not only those that can be measured
directly. The last term in regression 1 ²ijt is the random error.27
The summary statistics of all the variables included in X are presented in Table 6. The
sources used to collect all the data used in this paper are described in Appendix B. It should be
noted that after the inclusion of all the control variables, we end with approximately 162 dyads
of countries that renegotiated at the Paris Club. These dyads are related to 25 di®erent events of
defaults.
4.2 Some Considerations on the FDI Data
As we mentioned above, all the data used in the estimations are of yearly frequency. This is
especially important in the case of the dependent variable since our approach is di®erent to what
has been done in most previous FDI studies.28 We opt to use yearly data, which are likely to be
much more volatile than stocks and three-year averages in order to identify appropriately the timing
of the punishment.
A possible shortcoming of the data is the presence of a signi¯cant amount of missing values
for the FDI °ows. This issue has been tackled in di®erent ways by the literature yet we will deal
with it in a di®erent manner. The key issue to ponder is that it is not possible to know if a reported
missing value (of which there are a signi¯cant amount in the data) in a given year-country-pair cell
really corresponds to :
1. A non reported observation of either a positive or negative value of FDI.
2. The absence of FDI °ows between those particular countries in that year.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that FDI °ows can be negative, zero or positive
as are indeed observed in the OECD's database. In econometric terms, our sample su®ers a problem
27The inclusion of year e®ects does not change our results related to default issues but shows some collinearity with
other control variables
28For instance Daude and Stein (2006) uses FDI stocks and Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2004) use three-year
averages of °ows.
19that is best described as missing data rather than censored or truncated observations.
In light of these considerations, we will depart from the approach taken by Razin, Rubinstein,
and Sadka (2004) who treat the missing values as zero FDI °ows in order to implement Heckman's
sample selection procedure. We do so since, as we just discussed, it is not obvious that reported
missing values correspond indeed to no FDI °ows between countries. Moreover, taking into account
that a non trivial number of the °ows in the data set are negative, (and thus there is no truncation
in the data) if one adopts the Heckman model all this information would be lost.29
Another approach to deal with the missing values in the FDI °ow is to use the information of
the bilateral stocks of FDI and set a rule to put zeroes or missing values as Daude and Stein (2006)
do. In particular these authors, who are interested in studying the determinants of FDI stocks, use
the following rule:
² Change the missing value to zero if all the FDI °ows between the two countries are either zero
or missing.
² Leave the reported missing value of the stock data if there is some non-zero FDI °ow between
the corresponding country pair.
As can be seen from this discussion it is di±cult to implement a similar rule to distinguish
the truly zero FDI °ows among the missing values since the existence of a °ow implies a stock
(at least in the short run) but the existence of a stock does not imply a °ow in a future period.
Consequently, we will leave the missing data as it is reported in the original source and treat this
as a missing data problem.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 E®ects of Defaults on FDI
In this section we present and discuss the results of the empirical strategy described in the preceding
section. The evidence suggests that after a country defaults on its foreign sovereign debt, FDI °ows
from its creditors declines and there is some evidence that the size of default would be important
29The OECD data reports 3,055 negative bilateral FDI °ows from a total of 22,553 observations.
20to determine this reduction. The data does not suggest that defaulter countries face higher hurdles
to invest abroad after default episodes.
Table 7 presents the ¯rst set of results of equation (1). In the ¯rst column the coe±cient of
the variable Unilateral indicates that a country defaulting on its debt sees its FDI in°ows reduced in
around 0.05 percent points of its GDP. This e®ect looks signi¯cant from an economic point of view
if we compare it with the mean value of bilateral FDI °ows to GDP which is 0.07 percentage points
or with its median value of 0.001 percentage points. Our next step is to exploit the characteristics of
our data and examine if this decline in FDI °ows to defaulting countries is more pronounced for their
creditors. This will help us to gauge the existence of a punishment mechanism from the creditors
to defaulters. We do this adding the variable Paris to the regression and the results appear in the
second column of Table 7. The coe±cient of Paris can be interpreted as a punishment that creditors
impose to defaulter countries as it indicates the marginal reduction in FDI coming from countries
involved in the renegotiation, while the change in FDI °ows coming from the representative country
is captured in the variable Unilateral.
As can be seen, the coe±cient of Paris is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero while
the coe±cient of Unilateral turns out to be positive. The data suggests then that it is important
to separate the decline in FDI °ows between both types of countries since it seems to be the case
that the default punishment comes from countries directly involved and not from everywhere.
A natural question that follows is the economic signi¯cance of this e®ect. Inspecting Table 7
one can appreciate that the point estimate of the bilateral default is of a similar order of magnitude
to the one of a trade treaty. In other words, the decline in FDI that follows a bilateral default
is comparable to the positive e®ect that a trade treaty has on this type of capital °ow. Next we
quantify the e®ect on economic growth of the decline on FDI that follows after sovereign default.










The second term of the right hand side of (2) corresponds to the sum of our coe±cients
Paris and Unilateral. To gauge the e®ect of FDI on economic growth we take the results from
Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004b) which indicate that the e®ect of FDI on growth
depends on the level of ¯nancial development of the host country. From (2) we conclude that
growth will diminish approximately 0.4 percentage points in the year of default as a consequence
21of the decline in FDI that we estimate.30 This e®ect is bigger in magnitude to what Berthelon
(2004) reports would be the bene¯t for a country of signing a free trade agreement with a country
of the size of Canada. This quantitative evidence suggests then that the cost of default in terms
of economic growth is comparable to the bene¯ts associated with policy actions like higher trade
openness through bilateral trade agreements. 31
It is important to discuss some interpretations that could arise from empirical exercises study-
ing the e®ects of defaults and that our approach would be helpful to deal with. First, it could be
the case that a default triggers the fear of future expropriation, say, for example, that political
instability or uncertainty is revealed in a default. In our case, we think that this would be captured
in the Unilateral variable rather than in the Paris variable since we expect to see a reduction from
every possible source of FDI and not mainly from the countries that are involved in the renego-
tiation. A possibility that we cannot deal with given data availability, is that the change in the
fear of expropriation is more important for countries which debt was defaulted upon. However,
it could be argued that if a default leads to a fear of future expropriation and a fall in FDI, this
could be a signi¯cant threat that could sustain sovereign lending.32 In any case, anecdotal evidence
about the relationship between defaults and expropriation risk is not conclusive. Tomz and Wright
(2008) provide historical evidence that expropriation and defaults have not coincided over time while
Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2007) mention that after Argentinean default in 2001 measures
of expropriation risk as calculated by the Heritage Foundation and Fraser Institute deteriorated
sharply. Also, in an attempt to ameliorate the probability that our coe±cient is contaminated by
30We use the coe±cients reported in Table 4 of Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004b) and evaluate the
marginal e®ect in the mean value of ¯nancial development reported in that paper. Those authors run this regression:
Growth = ¯1 ¢ FDI + ¯2 ¢ (Financial Development £ FDI) + ¦ ¢ Z





Following the estimates of ¯1, ¯2 reported in Table 4 of Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004b) for each
of the six di®erent measures of ¯nancial development to calculate
@ Growth
@ FDI
= ¯1 + ¯2 £ Mean (Financial Development)
Finally we multiply this by ¢FDI after the default which corresponds to the sum of the coe±cients of Paris and
Unilateral and add this number 10 times which is the average number of creditors with which each defaulter renego-
tiates.
31Anecdotal evidence and several papers that use micro data ¯nd that FDI has positive e®ect in an economy through
di®erent channels like for instance spillover e®ects (see Javorcik (2004)). However, the evidence on the e®ects of FDI
on growth has been ambiguous and some works ¯nd a small e®ect (Carkovic and Levine (2002). Thus, it is possible
that the real costs of defaults derived from a reduction on FDI were higher than the suggested by the e®ects on growth.
The nature of our exercises and data does not allow to make sensible quantitative comparisons to the literature using
micro data.
32We owe this interpretation to a referee.
22these considerations we do use institutional and political variables in our regressions.
Another possibility could be that the results were driven by the existence of shocks in the
countries involved in capital transactions. Countries that default on sovereign debt are likely to be
in a situation of economic distress that would a®ect negatively its FDI in°ows (e.g. negative shock
to productivity). The variable Unilateral is more likely to capture these circumstances than the
Paris variable. In case of economic distress, the reduction in FDI would come from all countries and
not only from disgruntled creditors.33 Our identi¯cation strategy relies on the fact that there are
countries which debts were not defaulted upon and are a source of FDI. This reduces the probability
that our result showing that the reduction in FDI °ows is mainly from countries involved in the
renegotiation is coming from the lack of FDI °ows from countries which debt was not defaulted.
The estimation of the punishment to defaulters through the coe±cient ¯ is not likely to
be a®ected by a problem of reverse causality. This is due to the fact that countries involved in
renegotiations at the Paris Club are exogenously determined at the time of default since the loan
contracts were signed before the default takes place. Therefore countries that sit at the Paris Club
to renegotiate sovereign payments are not selected on the basis of current FDI °ows. On the other
hand, one should also consider that renegotiation with sovereign creditors at the Paris Club takes
place after the country has ceased to meet its debt obligations. Then, from this perspective, our
variable Paris measures default with some lag. Therefore the reverse causality concern is diminished
by this consideration that makes unlikely that current FDI °ows a®ect the decision to default taken
previously.
We analyze next if the size of debt under renegotiation plays any role in the punishment.
Capital markets may punish more those countries defaulting on a large amount of debt than coun-
tries defaulting on a small amount. Our database has information on the amount involved in the
renegotiation process in the Paris Club and we take this as a measure of the size of default. As
explained earlier, we only have data on the total amount of debt renegotiated by each defaulter
with all its creditors. In other words, there is no information on the amount of debt renegotiated
by the defaulter with each of its creditors. 34 This feature of the data impedes the inclusion of an
interaction term between the Paris variable and the amount defaulted to each creditor, that would
had told us how the punishment of each creditor varies with the size of his losses. This lack of
information in our data is a limitation to the analysis and consequently the results on this matter
should be taken with caution. In spite of this limitation there is some evidence that the size of the
punishment is indeed increasing in the amount of debt defaulted.
33As noted we use several variables referring to the existence of crisis and the business cycles of the source and host
countries (and the interaction between them).
34Also, as explained before, we do not have data on the size of the e®ective creditors' losses (\haircuts") in the
renegotiation process.
23In column 3 of Table 7 we add then to the regression the variable Amount constructed as the
amount renegotiated as a share of defaulter countries' GDP. The coe±cient of this variable has a
negative sign but it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at conventional levels. In column 4 of
Table 7 we drop from the regression the variable Paris and we see that the amount over GDP's
coe±cient becomes signi¯cantly less than zero. This, in part, is consequence of the correlation
existing with Paris given the nature of our data, which makes di±cult to separate both e®ects.
However, note that the size of the coe±cient of the amount variable has not changed from column
3 to column 4. To evaluate the economic signi¯cance of this coe±cient we will use a procedure
analogous to the one explained above for the case of default.35 Using this procedure we estimate
than if the country increases the amount defaulted in 12% of GDP (one standard deviation of
the observed distribution of the amount defaulted), economic growth would decline 0.3 percentage
points in the year of default.
Our next empirical exercise is to test for another plausible punishment for default highlighted
in the theoretical literature; that is, limits to the purchase of foreign assets for the defaulter. We
test this hypothesis including in regression (1) the dummy variable Exclude as explained in Section
4. If defaulter countries are precluded from investment opportunities abroad as a cost of defaulting
we would ¯nd a negative sign on this variable. The results of this estimation appear column 5 of
Table 7 and do not support this hypothesis: the coe±cient of this variable turns out to be positive
suggesting that FDI out°ows from countries that default increase in those periods.
Summarizing the ¯ndings of this section, we show that defaulting countries do see reduced
their FDI °ows which constitutes evidence in favor of capital markets punishing countries that do
not repay their debts. The evidence suggests that not all countries punish the defaulter but only
the ones directly a®ected by the default which, we think, is evidence in favor that the e®ect comes
as a consequence of the default and not from other possible channels. In spite of the limitations of
our data, there is some evidence suggesting that bigger amounts renegotiated a®ect negatively the
in°ows of FDI to a country. We do not ¯nd evidence indicating that closing defaulters investment
opportunities abroad is a relevant default punishment.
5.2 E®ects of Reputation
In this section we will complement the previous analysis looking at how a country's default record
in the past a®ects the amount of FDI °ows it receives. We will look then at the extent to which
the country's reputation as a bad (or good) payer a®ects the amount of capital °ows it receives.







24This exercise can shed light on several interesting issues related to international capital °ows and
defaults. First, it is natural to think that countries with large records of defaults have a worse
reputation as good payers than countries that have a short record and, consequently, receive less
capital °ows. Also, the default punishment is likely to be temporary in nature. Countries that
default would not be permanently excluded from capital markets and condemned to permanent
autarky; rather it is likely that after some time the capital °ows return to previous levels.36 Our
analysis will help to quantify the strength and relevance of these features of international capital
markets.
We test these hypothesis using the variables in matrix Z that we add to regression (1). The
¯rst regression, presented in column one of Table 8, adds to the basic speci¯cation a variable that
measures the amount of time (measured in years) elapsed from a country's last default. The coe±-
cient of this variable would indicate the rate at which countries are forgiven by their creditors. Since
we observe that countries are not kept out of the international ¯nancial community permanently,
we expect a positive sign for this coe±cient: the longer the time elapsed from the last default the
higher capital °ows to the country should be. The regression indicates that this coe±cient is indeed
positive, although it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at usual con¯dence levels. The point
estimate we obtain (0.003) says that around 17 years would be needed to neutralize the negative
contemporaneous e®ect of a default.37 Interestingly, Rose (2005) ¯nds that the e®ect of defaults on
trade last for approximately 15 years.38
In column 2 of Table 8 we incorporate to the regression a variable that corresponds to the
number of bilateral defaults in the previous ¯ve years. The coe±cient of this last variable is negative
suggesting that countries are not only punished contemporaneously for defaulting (measured by
Paris) but also for their misdeeds in recent years. This ¯nding indicates then that the track record
of a country is important in determining its capital °ows. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that international capital markets care about countries reputation as good payers. The higher the
number of defaults in the past the lower the reputation and, consequently, the lower the °ows to
that country.
In similar spirit to the previous exercises we include in column 3 of Table 8 a new variable
with the number of bilateral defaults incurred by a country during the period before the previous
ten years.39 Using this variable allows us to check if the negative e®ect of default's record decreases
36Casual observation indicates that countries that have defaulted recently have done so in the past which suggests
that exclusion from capital markets would be temporary and that the record of defaults may be important to determine
capital °ows to a country.





38He calculates that number using the default variable lagged in his regressions.
39In other words we test if bilateral FDI °ows in year t are a®ected by the total number of defaults observed before
25over time. If this were the case we would observe that the number of defaults incurred in the last
¯ve years have a higher e®ect than the number of defaults incurred before the last ten years. This
is what we ¯nd as can be seen in column 3 of table 8. The coe±cient of the number of defaults
incurred before the previous ten years is smaller than that of the number of defaults in the last 5
years and it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. We do not use the number of defaults incurred
between the previous ¯ve and ten years because of the high correlation between this variable and
the ones referring to the number of defaults in the last ¯ve years and older than ten years used in
the regression.
Our ¯nal speci¯cation aims to test if a default in the past implies a reduction of current FDI
in°ows for the country and if this e®ect persist or declines over time. For this we construct two
dummy variables. The ¯rst one takes the value 1 if the country has made one or more defaults in
any of the previous ¯ve years and the second one takes the value 1 if the country committed one or
more defaults in any year between t ¡ 6 and t ¡ 10. These variables di®er with the previous ones
because they do not control by the intensity of default as measured by the total number of default
in each window of time. In this sense we are measuring here if the eventual stigma of sovereign
defaulters is worsened or not by more episodes of default. On the other hand, countries undergoing
payment di±culties might conduct more than one round of negotiations with the Paris Club over
a period of, for example, three years. In our data each of these negotiations will be recorded as a
di®erent default episode.40 Therefore, this speci¯cation will also serve as a robustness check of our
previous results.
The results of these regressions appear in column 4 of Table 8. The sign of the contempo-
raneous default variable (Paris) is negative as always. The dummy variable that considers if a
default existed in the last ¯ve years has a negative sign while the other dummy variable enters with
a positive sign and it is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The coe±cient of this last variable
is lower than (the absolute value) of the dummy indicating if there was a default in the previous
¯ve years. This result suggests that the e®ects of default last for some years but the punishment
decreases over time. It should be noted that the size of the coe±cient of the dummy variable for
at least one default during the previous ¯ve years (-0.09) is comparable magnitude as the one of
contemporaneous default (i.e the coe±cient of Paris).41
We recognize that we may have used somewhat rigid structures in our estimations. For
example, there is no particular motive to split the lag variables in the way we have or there is no
year t ¡ 10.
40As can be seen in Table 1 there are several cases where countries renegotiated their sovereign debts with the Paris
Club more than once on a span of three years.
41According to the numbers calculated earlier, economic growth would decline in total in 0.2 (2£0.1) percentage
points if it defaults in the current year and at least one other time during the previous ¯ve.
26reason a priori to split the variable for the number of defaults in the way we have split it. However,
we have tried alternative speci¯cations and the results are similar pointing to the same direction.
Summarizing, the evidence suggests that the penalty imposed by capital markets is temporary
rather than permanent and that countries' default record is important. This suggests that countries
reputation as good payers is important for capital °ows.
6 Conclusions
Sometimes countries have ¯nancial di±culties and they restructure or default on their debts. Since
sovereign default is by no means the norm in international capital markets, the unilateral interrup-
tion of debt payments probably carries some cost to the defaulter country. Several possible default
costs have been identi¯ed by commentators and the literature. Of these, the exclusion from capital
markets is arguably the most cited one. This is the default punishment we have tried to test em-
pirically in this paper. We extend previous research in this area by focusing on the borrower-lender
relationship, characteristics of defaults and the analysis of some characteristics that would in°uence
countries' reputation as good payers.
In our study we focused on FDI °ows, which has become a very important source of capital
to developing countries. The data on FDI °ows and Sovereign Debt renegotiation that we used
identi¯es the FDI source and recipient countries as well as the countries involved in the renegotiation
(i.e. debtor and creditors seeing their claims renegotiated). This is a key feature of the data and
allows the identi¯cation of a punishment to defaulters since we distinguished the impact of default
on FDI °ows coming from those countries directly involved in the default renegotiation from those
not directly a®ected by the default.
Our ¯ndings indicate that the reduction in FDI in°ows does not originate from every country
that could be a potential source of funds but only from those directly involved in the renegotiation.
This evidence suggests that the punishment that follows a sovereign default is not universal since
it appears to be con¯ned to those countries whose debt claims were defaulted on. We think that
this ¯nding is in favor of the hypothesis that the reduction is indeed the consequence of a default
and not driven by other forces like for example, a bad shock to the economy. In turn this would be
evidence that this decline in FDI in°ows constitutes a punishment to the defaulter.
We found that the contemporaneous e®ect of a default is equivalent to not signing a trade
treaty. We also estimate, using other ¯ndings in the literature, that the contemporaneous e®ect of
27default is a reduction of 0.4 percentage points of the growth rate of GDP (duplicated if there was
another default in the previous years). Concluding if this magnitude is big enough to constitute a
relevant punishment is an interesting avenue for future research.
We analyzed if the size of the debts renegotiated a®ects the punishment and we found that
the answer seems to be that this is the case. Next, with the objective of identifying another element
of the nature of the punishment, we test if defaulter's investment abroad are reduced after a default
as suggested by some theoretical contributions. We did not ¯nd any evidence in favor of that
hypothesis.
We also identi¯ed some defaulters' characteristics that are likely to a®ect their reputation to
see if they are indeed important determinants of countries' capital in°ows. First, we inquire to what
extent countries with a large default record have a worse reputation than countries with relatively
better repayment performance and thus receive less capital °ows. Then we studied some dynamic
aspects of punishments to defaulter like if they have a temporary component and the speed to which
defaulters are forgiven by their creditors.42 Our empirical ¯ndings point in the same direction: the
higher the number of defaults the lower the capital °ows to that country and default punishment
vanishes as time goes by.
Overall, our ¯ndings support the existence of a punishment for defaulting countries. We leave
for future research the related question if this cost of default e®ectively in°uences the decision to
default.
42As noted in the literature review some previous contributions have tested if past defaults a®ect capital °ows to a
country, for example Ozler (1993) and Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
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31Table 1: Paris Club Renegotiations
(Data since 1980)




Argentina 1985 1987 1989 1991 1992
Benin 1989 1991 1993 1996 2000 2003
Bolivia 1986 1988 1990 1992 1995 1998 2001
Brazil 1983 1987 1988 1992
Bulgaria 1991 1992 1994
Burkina Faso 1991 1993 1996 2000 2002
Cambodia 1995
Cameroon 1989 1992 1994 1995 1997 2001
Central African Republic 1981 1983 1985 1988 1990 1994 1998
Chad 1989 1995 1996 2001
Chile 1985 1987
Congo 1986 1990 1994 1996 2004
DR of Congo 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987 1989 2002 2003
Costa Rica 1983 1985 1989 1991 1993
Cote D'Ivoire 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1991 1994 1998 2002
Croatia 1995
Dominican Republic 1985 1991 2004
Ecuador 1983 1985 1988 1989 1992 1994 2000 2003
Egypt 1987 1991
El Salvador 1990
Equatorial Guinea 1985 1989 1992 1994
Ethiopia 1992 1997 2001 2002 2003
Gabon 1987 1988 1989 1991 1994 1995 2000 2004
Gambia 1986 2003
Ghana 1996 2001 2002 2004
Guatemala 1993
Guinea 1986 1989 1992 1995 1997 2001
Guinea-Bissau 1987 1989 1995 2001
Guyana 1989 1990 1993 1996 1999 2004
Haiti 1995
Honduras 1990 1992 1996 1999 2004 2005
Indonesia 1998 2000 2002 2005
Jamaica 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1993
Jordan 1989 1992 1994 1997 1999 2002
Kenya 1994 2000 2004
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 2005
Liberia 1980 1981 1983 1984
Macedonia 1995 2000
Madagascar 1981 1982 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1997 2000 2001 2004
Malawi 1982 1983 1988 2001
Mali 1988 1989 1992 1996 2000 2003
Mauritania 1985 1986 1987 1989 1993 1995 2000 2002
Mexico 1983 1986 1989
Morocco 1983 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992
Mozambique 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 1999 2001
Nicaragua 1991 1995 1998 2002 2004
Niger 1983 1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1994 1996 2001 2004
Nigeria 1986 1989 1991 2000
Pakistan 1981 1999 2001
Panama 1985 1990
Peru 1983 1984 1991 1993 1996
Philippines 1984 1987 1989 1991 1994
Poland 1981 1985 1987 1990 1991
Romania 1982 1983
Russia 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999
32Country Years in which the Country started Negotiations with the Paris Club
Rwanda 1998 2002 2005
Sao Tome And Principe 2000
Senegal 1981 1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1998 2000 2004
Sierra Leone 1980 1984 1986 1992 1994 1996 2001 2002
Somalia 1985 1987
Sri Lanka 2005
Sudan 1982 1983 1984
Tanzania 1986 1988 1990 1992 1997 2000 2002
Togo 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1990 1992 1995
Trinidad And Tobago 1989 1990
Turkey 1980
Uganda 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1995 1998 2000
Ukraine 2001
Vietnam 1993
Yemen 1996 1997 2001
Yugoslavia 1984 1985 1986 1988 2001
Zambia 1983 1984 1986 1990 1992 1996 1999 2002 2005
33Table 2: Countries in OECD FDI Database
(Sample Period: 1980-2003)
Industrial OECD Developing OECD Non OECD
Australia Czech Republic Bulgaria
Austria Hungary Romania
Belgium Korea Russia
Canada Mexico Slovak Republic
Denmark Poland Slovenia
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36Table 5: FDI and Default Data
(Descriptive Statistics)
Variable Name Mean Median Standard Min Max
Deviation
FDI In°ow / GDP of Recipient, % 0.07 0.0005 0.40 -7.1 18.9
FDI In°ow per Capita1 10.8 0.0237 165.1 -3594.9 18161.5
Paris 0.03 0 0.18 0.0 1.0
Amount Defaulted2 1976.1 411 4758.3 1.0 40200.0
1 In dollars of 2000
2 In millions of dollars of 2000.
Table 6: Regressions Varibles Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Mean Standard
Deviation
Max Min
Product GDPs per capita 13.06 7.82 37.79 1.05
Product GDPs 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Regional Agreement 0.15 0.35 1.00 0.00
Capital Account Openess 1.11 1.51 2.68 -1.71
Financial Development 0.49 1.97 11.92 0.00
In°ation Volatility 0.25 1.87 30.80 -0.01
Openess 58.72 32.74 228.88 12.35
Di®erence in Years of Schooling -0.26 1.83 4.36 -4.55
Government Stability 7.80 1.86 11.08 1.00
Non Corruption Index 4.31 1.35 6.00 0.00
Executive Constraints 6.44 1.14 7.00 1.00
37Table 7: Regression Results 1
(Dependent Variable: FDI In°ow to Host's GDP in year t (%) )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unilateral -0.046 0.051 0.051 -0.026 0.051
[0.027]* [0.028]* [0.028]* [0.030] [0.028]*






GDP per Capita Country j 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Trade Treaty 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102
[0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]**
Capital Account Openness 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]**
Financial Development -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[0.007]* [0.007]* [0.007]* [0.007]* [0.007]*
In°ation Volatility -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Trade Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Di®erence in Years of Schooling 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.030
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Government Stability 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Non Corruption Index 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*
Executive Constraints 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
IMF Program 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]* [0.011]* [0.011]
Crisis -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Output Gap Country j 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]**
Output Gap Country i 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Output Gap Country j interacted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
with Output Gap Country i [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant -0.291 -0.293 -0.292 -0.290 -0.294
[0.085]*** [0.084]*** [0.085]*** [0.085]*** [0.084]***
Observations 10441 10441 10441 10441 10441
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Standard errors clustered by dyads in brackets.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
38Table 8: Regression Results 2
(Dependent Variable: FDI In°ow to Host's GDP in year t (%) )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unilateral 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.044
[0.029]* [0.028]* [0.029]* [0.028]
Paris -0.103 -0.107 -0.107 -0.087
[0.041]** [0.040]*** [0.044]** [0.035]**
Years elapsed since last bilateral default 0.003
[0.003]
Number of Defaults between t-1 and t-5 -0.037 -0.038
[0.022]* [0.014]***
Number of Defaults before t-10 -0.001
[0.021]
At least one Default between t-1 and t-5 -0.088
[0.038]**
At least one Default between t-5 and t-10 0.050
[0.037]
GDP per Capita Country j 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Trade Treaty 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.106
[0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]** [0.050]**
Capital Account Openness 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]*
Financial Development -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
[0.007]* [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]*
In°ation Volatility -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Trade Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Di®erence in Years of Schooling 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025]
Government Stability 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]*
Non Corruption Index 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]**
Executive Constraints 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
IMF Program 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.024
[0.011]* [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
Crisis -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Output Gap Country j 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*
Output Gap Country i 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Output Gap Country j interacted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
with Output Gap Country i [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant -0.300 -0.303 -0.303 -0.313
[0.085]*** [0.085]*** [0.085]*** [0.085]***
Observations 10441 10441 10441 10441
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Standard errors clustered by dyads in brackets.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
39A Comparing Di®erent Measures of Sovereign Default
As we have explained, we say that a country is in sovereign default of its external debts if it
renegotiates its o±cial obligations through the Paris Club in a given year. Even though this measure
of default has it own merits (most notably it identi¯es the individual creditors of the defaulter) it
certainly is not the only measure of default available. Moreover it measures default only of o±cial
nature (i.e. government to government loans) which might not constitute the most signi¯cant
foreign liability of the country. In light of these possible objections to our measure of default we
compare the Paris Club indicator with the sovereign default information compiled by Standard and
Poor's. This institution compiles a list that indicates the years during which a country's sovereign
foreign debt, either bonds or bank loans, was in default.43 This Standard and Poor's indicator of
default has been used in several papers that have studied this topic before. In order to gauge how
similar our Paris Club indicator is to the Standard and Poor's one we calculated the probability that
Standard and Poor's considers that a country's foreign debt (bonds and bank loans) is in default in
the year that that country renegotiates with its Paris Club creditors. We calculated this probability
for various time spans during which Standard and Poor's might classify a country in default and
the results appear in Table 944.
Table 9: Probability (%) of being in Sovereign Debt Default
if country renegotiated its O±cial Debt in Paris Club
Default in t Default in t or t ¡ 1 Default in t, t ¡ 1 or t ¡ 2 Default in t, t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2 or t ¡ 3
64.1 64.6 71.0 73.0
As can be seen in Table 9 the likelihood that a country who is renegotiating at the Paris Club
is also in default of its other external sovereign liabilities is substantial. Moreover, Table 1 suggests
that Paris Club renegotiations tend to occur after the country has defaulted on its other debts: the
probability increases if we allow for a larger time span during which Standard and Poor's might have
considered the country in default.45 This point has important implications for our identi¯cation
strategy because the Paris Club captures to some extent default episodes that occur a few years
before which lessens the likelihood of reverse causation going from capital °ows to sovereign default.
43See Standard and Poor's (2004) for the complete list of defaults compiled by Standard and Poor's
44The numbers in the table correspond to the probability that a country is renegotiating its foreign debt at the
Paris Club in year t given that it is classi¯ed as a sovereign defaulter by Standard and Poor's during in at least one
of the years between t and t ¡ i for i = 0;1;2;3.
45The assertion that default to banks and bond loans tends to precede Paris Club renegotiations is reinforced by the
fact that the probability that a country classi¯ed as a defaulter by Standard and Poor's given that it is renegotiating
at the Paris Club is only 25%, much lower than the values that appear in Table 9.
40B Data Appendix
Foreign Direct Investment Flows The FDI °ows are taken from the OECD's International
Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1980-2003. Each bilateral °ow is in millions of US dollars
and is normalized by the host's country nominal GDP in dollars taken from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI) database available in http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/query/
and expressed in percentage points in the regressions.
Countries in the OECD report both out°ows and in°ows of FDI observed each year among them and
all the countries detailed Table 2. Therefore, for the countries in the OECD there are two potential
sources for the same bilateral FDI °ow that country i sends to country j: (i) The out°ow reported by
country i to country j and (ii) the in°ow reported by country j from country i. Theoretically both
magnitudes should be identical but di®erences in each country's reporting standards will usually
imply that they di®er in practices. We assume that the in°ow data is more likely to re°ect the
\true" identity of the source country. Given this, we will measure the FDI in°ow from country i to
country j as the one in°ow reported by country j from country i whenever possible.
On the other hand, countries located in what we call in this paper Developing OECD are recent
admits to that organization so they have not reported FDI data over an extended period of time.
Therefore, in order to maximize the amount of observations, we will use the data reported by
Industrial OECD countries when the FDI °ows involves a Developing OECD country. Finally, the
OECD data obviously does not collect information reported by countries that do not belong to that
organization so we must rely on the data reported by OECD countries in this case. The details of
the information used for each type of bilateral FDI °ow are provided in Table 10.
Table 10: Details of OECD FDI Database
Source
Destination Industrial OECD Developing OECD Non-OECD
Industrial OECD In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination
Developing OECD Out°ow reported by Source In°ow reported by Destination In°ow reported by Destination
Non-OECD Out°ow reported by Source Out°ow reported by Source No data
Paris Club Data All the Paris Club data used in this paper is available at the institutions' website
(http://www.clubdeparis.org). We completed the information for the period 1956-1997 that is
available in Professor Andrew Rose's website (http://haas.berkeley.edu/~arose) with the data
from the Paris Club's website. The amount of debt which the creditors bring to the negotiating
table is in millions of US dollars and is normalized by the debtor's country nominal GDP in dollars
from the WDI and expressed in percentage points.
GDP Data GDP per capita is calculated dividing the total GDP in constant year 2000 dollars and
the total population of the country in each year. Both series are taken from the WDI database.
Regional Trade Agreements This data is compiled by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
we extended the information that is available in Andrew Rose's website up to year 1997 with the lat-
est information available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
Capital Account Openness To measure this we use the index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002)
which is available at Menzi Chinn's webpage http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html.
Higher values of this variable indicate that the economy is more open to cross-border capital °ows.
41Financial Development We use the ratio of credit to the private sector to nominal GDP suggested










where t denotes the corresponding year and:
1. F is credit by deposit money banks (line 22d from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
of the IMF) and other ¯nancial institutions (line 42d from the IFS) to the private sector .
2. GDP is nominal GDP from the WDI.
3. Pe is end-of period CPI (line 64 from the IFS)
4. Pa is the average annual CPI.
Openness Correspond to the traditional measure of trade openness that measures the ratio of a
country's total trade (exports plus imports) to its GDP. All the series are taken from the WDI
database and the resulting index is measured in percentage points.
In°ation Volatility This is de¯ned as the standard deviation of the monthly in°ation rate (mea-
sured in percentage points) observed in the 12 months of each year. This is calculated with the
with CPI data from the IFS.
Di®erence in Years of Schooling. This is computed as the di®erence in the average years of
secondary schooling in the total population of country j and that of country i. The information
is taken from the Barro and Lee database which contains the educational attainment data every
¯ve years. In order to obtain information for each year we used a linear interpolation procedure
available in the statistical software Stata 8.0.
Government Stability According to the International Country Risk by PRS Group which pro-
duces these data this index measures the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s),
and its ability to stay in o±ce. The average yearly rating varies from 0 to 12, where a higher score
means lower risk.
Non Corruption Index This is assessment of corruption within the political system. The average
yearly rating ranges from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower corruption risk. The source of
this data is also the International Country Risk by PRS Group.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Programs This data comes from the IMF and gives
information on the type of IMF program under which the country and contains details on the
starting and ending date of each agreement.
Balance of Payment Crisis This dummy variable is built following Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), see their data appendix for the exact de¯nition.
42GDP Gaps We calculate them as the di®erence between the current GDP and the trend GDP
measured by the Hodrick and Prescott ¯lter procedure in Stata 9.0.
Standard and Poor's default indicator The information appears in Standard and Poor's (2004)
and a country was considered to be in default if it either its \Foreign Currency Bond Debt" or
\Foreign Currency Bank Debt" was said to be in default by this ¯nancial institution.
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